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ABSTRACT 
 
Given that mitigating climate change is a large-scale global issue, what obligations do 
individuals have to lower their personal carbon emissions?  I survey recent suggestions 
by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Dale Jamieson and offer models for thinking about 
their respective approaches. I then present a third model based on the notion of structural 
violence. While the three models are not mutually incompatible, each one suggests a 
different focus for mitigating climate change. In the end, I agree with Sinnott-Armstrong 
that people have limited moral obligations to directly lower personal emissions, but I 
offer different reasons for this conclusion, namely that the structural arrangements of our 
lives place a limit on how much individuals can restrict their own emissions. Thus, 
individuals should focus their efforts on changing the systems instead (e.g., the design of 
cities, laws and regulation, etc.), which will lead to lower emissions on a larger scale. 
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
 
 In debates between deontological and consequentialist moral approaches, the 
question arises:  Should one keep one’s self pure regardless of the actions of others, or 
should one wade into the mess to ensure the most just outcome?  Should I tell the truth to 
the murderer at the door and let him decide how to act, or I should lie to him to save my 
friend?  This puzzle is echoed in recent debates about mitigating climate change.  Should 
I limit my own personal emissions regardless of how much everyone else is polluting?  
Or should I aim to reduce total global emissions even if that means increasing my own 
emissions to do it, just as Al Gore flies around the world making presentations about 
climate change? 
 In this paper, I focus on two authors who agree that one should aim to limit total 
global emissions.2  As utilitarians, they agree that the moral action is that which brings 
about the best outcome, which in this case means mitigating climate change by limiting 
total carbon emissions.  Interestingly, they disagree on the best way to bring about that 
change.3  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has recently argued that since it is hard to trace the 
causes of climate change to any one individual, it appears that individuals have little 
obligation to limit personal emissions but rather should focus efforts on large-scale 
political change.  By contrast, Dale Jamieson proposes that individuals do have 
obligations to directly limit emissions.  He maintains that one’s actions should be non-
contingent; one should not wait to see what everyone else is doing, but rather strive now 
to limit one’s own emissions regardless of the high emissions of others.  Such focus on 
the self rather than on the political scale will have the effect needed, he argues, because 
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we are social creatures; such an embodiment of “green virtues” can serve as a role model 
to influence others, thereby creating the large-scale effect needed. 
I suggest that the two authors are using different models for characterizing climate 
change.  I offer a third model, which leads to a conclusion similar to Sinnott-
Armstrong’s, but based on different reasons.  I draw from the notion of “structural 
violence” to illustrate how infrastructures in the U.S., such as food distribution and 
housing, leave limited room for personal choice when it comes to emissions.  Structural 
violence offers a model in which harm is due to the structures of social institutions; 
blame or cause of the harm cannot be traced to any one individual.  Such a model can 
help avoid some of the puzzles in Sinnott-Armstrong’s account.  Thus, I offer different 
reasons to support Sinnott-Armstrong’s conclusion that one should focus efforts on large-
scale change rather than individual responsibility.   
 
 
2. SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG – THE THRESHOLD MODEL 
 
 In his paper “It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral 
Obligations,” Walter Sinnott-Armstrong4 recognizes that unless everyone acts, individual 
efforts to reduce emissions will have little direct effect on climate change.  Given that, 
what are the moral obligations of one person to reduce her own personal emissions?  He 
surveys and rejects several reasons to think one has moral obligations to limit one’s 
personal emissions in such a situation.  He concludes that while one does have 
obligations to urge larger institutions such as governments to limit total emissions, one 
has no obligations to change one’s personal life to limit one’s own emissions.  He offers 
several arguments for this, but here I will focus on just a few.   
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 Sinnott-Armstrong recognizes that if a person’s actions cause harm, then she has a 
reason not to act.  However, he argues, there is no sense in which my personal emissions 
cause global warming.5  Nor, he continues, do my actions cause the resulting weather 
patterns that make up climate change: “No storms or draughts or heat waves can be 
traced to my individual act of driving” (291). He writes that a single act of driving (or 
even a lifetime of driving!) is not a sufficient condition for climate change, since one 
person’s driving will not by itself lead to climate change.  Nor is it a necessary condition, 
since if one person stopped driving, climate change would still occur.  Thus, the driving 
of one person does not cause climate change. 
Sinnott-Armstrong considers two interpretations of what it means to cause climate 
change, and thus cause harm, in this case.  One could cause harm by creating a problem 
that would not have been there otherwise, or one could exacerbate an existing problem. 
Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, however, that my emissions neither cause climate change 
nor make existing climate change worse.  He writes, 
The point is not that the harm I cause is imperceptible. I admit that some harms 
can be imperceptible because they are too small…. Instead, the point is simply 
that my individual joyride does not cause global warming, climate change, or any 
of their resulting harms, at least directly. (291) 
 
Causing harms, even small harms, might give a person reasons to refrain from an action.  
In the case of climate change, however, Sinnott-Armstrong maintains that such reasons 
do not apply, since one person’s emissions cannot cause climate change, nor make it 
worse.  Yet he is not a skeptic about global warming.  He fully believes that, collectively, 
human emissions of greenhouse gases is causing global warming, and will likely cause 
devastating climate change (286).  So then what could he have in mind?   
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We get a clue from an analogy he draws with five people pushing a car over a 
cliff.  Suppose it takes just three people to push the car.  If a sixth person were to join, he 
notes, the sixth person’s actions are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause the car to go 
over the cliff (287).6   This analogy indicates that Sinnott-Armstrong might have in mind 
what I will call a Threshold Model.  According to the Threshold Model, specific changes 
to weather patterns would require a certain threshold of emissions in order to occur.  As 
total global emissions rise, there would be no effect on climate until a threshold level is 
reached.  Once that threshold level of emissions is reached, then the resulting sudden rise 
in global temperatures would begin to cause negatives effects on climate. 
Some might object, noting that there is still much debate about how total global 
emissions change the climate, and to what extent those changes are gradual and/or 
sudden.  Even given these debates, however, there is still some sense in which weather 
changes are threshold events.  Consider, for example, the common example of the theft of 
one grain of rice from someone who is hungry.  The victim has been harmed a little bit 
through the loss of that one grain.  By contrast, consider a storm.  If a storm causes a loss 
of crops, then causing the storm would cause harm.  However, if my carbon contributions 
are not enough to cause a storm, then no harm has been committed.  To apply that to 
personal emissions, suppose that total emissions are well below some threshold level.  In 
this case, even if my individual emissions cause tiny increases in global temperature (say, 
by breathing) my emissions could not result in the weather event.  Now suppose that total 
emissions are above some threshold level (see Figure 1) and are causing a weather event.  
Now if I were to reduce my personal emissions, total global emissions (the solid arrow) 
would decrease a tiny bit.  However, total emissions would still be above the threshold 
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level of emissions, which presumably causes the event, so my actions would have no 
effect on reducing harm due to the event.  According to the Threshold Model, changes to 
my personal emissions can neither cause nor mitigate the changes to the climate. Thus, 
Sinnott-Armstrong’s Sunday driving for fun would be morally permissible.  
Some might think this argument moves too quickly.  As I interpret Sinnott-
Armstrong, he avoids characterizing the situation as a typical sorites problems by seeing 
it as a case with sudden changes, rather than incremental changes.  Still, it is not clear 
whether climate change is indeed such a case.  Gradual increases in carbon emissions 
might indeed be causing small, gradual harms (slightly higher temperatures could affect 
crops incrementally, raise sea levels a little bit, etc.).  Moreover, it is not clear that a 
threshold climate change situation absolves individual emitters of blame after all or if it 
simply adds new puzzles about causation and blame (for a related discussion, see 
Chrisoula Andreou’s7 discussion on blame and action).  My goal is not to address such 
issues here, but rather to note that there is a philosophically simpler path to get the same 
conclusion.  First, however, let us look at an alternative suggestion.  Sinnott-Armstrong 
acknowledges that an individual’s personal habits might indirectly affect other people.  
Still, he argues that the results would still be minimal in the face of an overwhelming 
problem (292).  Jamieson, however, places a much higher importance on the social 
context of our actions. 
 
3. JAMIESON – THE LEAD-BY-EXAMPLE MODEL 
 
 Dale Jamieson8 agrees that the goal is to reduce the effects of climate change, 
presumably by reducing total global emissions.  He also agrees with Sinnott-Armstrong 
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that one individual’s personal emissions have little direct effect on global warming and 
climate change.  However, Jamieson argues that an individual’s personal emissions do 
matter morally – they have a significant indirect effect on total global emissions. 
 Jamieson emphasizes that we are social creatures and are influenced by others.  
Anyone can serve as a role model, and if that person reduces his emissions, then other 
people will see him.  Soon many people will be following his example and reducing their 
personal emissions.  Finally, if many people reduce personal emissions, then together we 
can reduce global emissions (179).  Here Jamieson argues that the best way to bring 
about the desired outcome is to model the desired behavior.  Thus, in the case of global 
warming, personal emissions and personal habits, not just large-scale political change, 
become very important.  One must set a good example by sticking to the virtuous action 
that reduces personal emissions (182). 
While Sinnott-Armstrong focuses on the actions of one individual in isolation, 
Jamieson steps back to see how our actions influence each other.  He argues that when 
faced with collective action problems such as climate change, one cannot wait for others 
to act, even if your action would have little effect by itself (172).  This standoff is 
reminiscent of George W. Bush9 stating that the U.S. will not sign the Kyoto Protocol 
since India and China had not signed on.10   Jamieson argues that since someone must act 
first to break up the standoff, the morally right thing to do is be that first person: cut your 
own personal emissions.11  Others will see your example and follow suit, resulting in a 
cascading set of actions that will bring down global emissions (see the dotted arrow in 
Figure 2).  While Sinnott-Armstrong claims that my actions do no good if other people do 
not act, Jamieson focuses on the other side: my actions can do good if they can influence 
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other people to act.  Thus, Jamieson concludes, the best way to reduce total global 
emissions is, indeed, to reduce one’s personal emissions; I should not wait to see what 
everyone else is doing, but rather do the virtuous thing and soon others will follow me. 
 
4. STRUCTURAL EMISSIONS MODEL 
 
I am drawn to Jamieson’s argument that individuals can serve as role models, and 
I think it has great potential as a critique when applied to the Threshold Model.  
Nonetheless, I propose that the Lead-By-Example Model has limits.  Let us grant for the 
sake of argument that one person can serve as a role model, and that she can successfully 
influence everyone to reduce emissions.  What would those reductions look like?  The 
State of Washington Department of Ecology12 recommends that citizens “Drive less, 
weather proof your home, change your lights, cut hot water usage” and so on. Yet will 
these changes be enough?  Gerald Gardner and Paul Stern13 estimate that if everyone in 
the U.S. implemented these sorts of changes, U.S. carbon emissions could be reduced by 
11%.  Admittedly, this is a significant amount, and well worth pursuing, but alone it is 
not enough to mitigate the U.S. share of some of the worst effects of climate change.  The 
U.S. needs to reduce annual emissions by 75% just to be at the global per capita 
average,14 and some bills have Congress setting sights on 80% reductions by 2050 to be 
in line with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recommendations for target 
global carbon levels.15 
Thus there seems to be a limit on how much individual and household changes 
can affect nation-wide emissions. Timothy Gutowski16 has led recent studies on personal 
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environmental impact, in which the authors incorporate infrastructures into their 
calculations.  Once government services are accounted for, the authors write,   
We identify a floor, below which environmental impacts for people living in the 
United States do not drop. For example, none of the life styles studied here ever 
resulted in an energy requirement below 120GJ (in 1997). This includes the life 
style of a five year old child, a homeless person and a Buddhist monk. While 
120GJ is about one third the American average in 1997 (350GJ), it is almost 
double the global average energy use in that year (64 GJ). (172) 
 
The environmental impact of a millionaire’s lifestyle can be nearly ten times that of an 
average U.S. citizen, yet even citizens at the limiting floor consume twice what citizens 
globally consume because of the high energy17 set-up of current built-in government 
infrastructure (police, roads, libraries, etc.).  Given these considerations, I would like to 
offer a third model for consideration, namely the Structural Emissions Model. 
Many have noted that systems strongly influence individual choices.  From 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s “nudges,”18 to incentives and economics systems, the 
structures that one encounters can shape one’s choices.  One particularly clear 
articulation of this appears in Johan Galtung’s description of “structure violence.”19  
Galtung suggests that even when no single individual causes violence, a system can cause 
violence.20  Paul Farmer21, among others, has built on this idea of structural violence by 
detailing how structures such as racism and poverty limit people’s choices, and can lead 
to health problems and premature death.  The notion of structures guiding people’s lives 
is far reaching, and can be applied to many situations, including our choices around 
personal emissions.  Structures are like roads in that they strongly guide the directions 
one can travel.  Driving off-road might still be possible, but very few people do it.  
Structures are also like roads in that they seem inevitable and unchangeable, and yet both 
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can be changed with enough conscious effort, albeit not usually by one individual (an 
individual can lobby the city to have a new road put in, or to have a road removed, but 
she rarely builds a new road herself).   
Sinnott-Armstrong offers a similar example when he suggests that mitigating 
climate change is analogous to repairing a bridge.  While I agree with analogy, I offer 
different reasons to employ it.  Sinnott-Armstrong argues that bridge repair is the job of 
the government and it is unreasonable to morally expect individual citizens to undertake 
the repairs themselves, even if they were capable of it (287).  He uses the analogy to 
argue that governments and individuals sometimes have different moral obligations, so 
that even if a government has an obligation to mitigate climate change, it does not 
necessarily follow that individuals also have that obligation.  By contrast, my use of the 
analogy is to show that certain paths can guide our actions without our realizing it, and it 
can be difficult to choose a different action without changing the direction of the path 
itself.  Thus, it might not be possible for an individual to significantly reduce her carbon 
emissions without there being changes to the structures in her life.  
The road or path is just a metaphor; an actual example of how structures limit or 
influence our choices would be a grocery store.  When you walk into an upscale organic 
grocery store to buy milk, only certain kinds of milk will be available on the shelf.  When 
you walk into a regular grocery store, different choices will be available.  In many poorer 
neighborhoods around the United States there are no organic grocery stores nearby, so to 
buy organic milk one would have to make a special trip; very few people will do this.  
Thus, decisions by grocery chains on where to put their stores and how to stock their 
shelves place limits on what people can choose to buy.22 
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When we apply the notion of structures to carbon emissions, we see how 
individuals could fall short of making the necessary changes to global emissions.  For 
example, in the U.S. many infrastructures are built around emissions, leaving limited 
room for personal choice.  One can trade in for a smaller car, but many people cannot get 
rid of their cars entirely; given the communities where they live, there is no other way to 
get to work or to the grocery store.23  One can try to be conscious about purchases, but 
there are many hidden environmental impacts associated with the products available for 
purchase in the United States.24  Individuals can choose to install double-paned windows, 
but so long as they are living in freestanding houses, there will be a limit on how much 
they can reduce heating and cooling costs.  Such homes are significantly less heat-
efficient than small, clustered apartments in apartment buildings.  The Structural 
Emissions Model directs us to think about changing the structures, not the individuals.  In 
these cases, we would think about how to change the communities, for example bringing 
housing and commercial areas closer together; screening what products are available in 
stores and increasing oversight on imports; and building apartments and condominiums 
instead of houses.    
 Some solutions are small and easily implemented by private institutions, such as 
universities switching the default on their computer labs from screen saver to sleep mode.  
Other small and simple fixes are highly controversial, and must be put forward by 
governments to have any effect at all.  Yet these structural changes could radically 
change the fight against climate emissions.  For instance, changing the price at the pump 
to reflect the true cost of gas, which is currently estimated somewhere between $8-
$10/gallon (incorporating negative externalities such as asthma, damage to water 
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systems, war, etc),25 would eventually lead to reduced individual trips, people moving 
closer to work, an increase in carpooling and demand for transit, etc.   
 Changing existing food subsidies is another structural change that is 
technologically simple but politically entangled.  Reducing meat and diary subsidies and 
increasing vegetable subsidies could influence market demand, thereby reducing methane 
emissions and other emissions related to the meat industry.26 Alternatively, making 
available meat that is grown in a lab, rather than a farm27 would change individual habits 
only minimally since low-emissions would be built into the product (though it would 
require a cultural shift). 
 Changes that are less controversial but much more involved include increasing the 
numbers of safe and protected bike lanes, such as those added in New York City, 
providing trams, subways and buses for transport, such as in Vancouver and Berlin, and 
adding curbside composting in addition to recycling in cities such as Seattle.   
 Ultimately, though, the best solutions will be at a scale that an individual can hope 
to influence: local communities.  The debate, after all, is about the obligations of 
individuals to reduce global emissions.   Individuals can affect their workplace, school 
district, university, neighborhood, local municipality, local businesses, etc.   
 For example, residents in Portland have constructed nearly a dozen co-housing 
communities where neighbors share walls, food, gardening, tools, large appliances (e.g., 
washing machines), and even solar panels.  In another example, students could expand 
upon Fritz Haeg’s model28 and change their university lawns, with their high water 
consumption and mowing, into community gardens with rock gardens, local plants, and 
benches. 
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Possible structural solutions range from the simple to the complex, from seamless 
shifts to radical cultural changes.  The key is that the Structural Emissions Model focuses 
on changing systems and the communities in which individuals live, not the individuals 
themselves (at least not directly). 
Even if the Lead-By-Example Model starts off successfully and one person can 
effectively influence a whole community to reduce its emissions, this is still not enough 
to mitigate climate change.  If individuals must act within current structures, such as 
roads for single cars and freestanding houses, there will be a limiting floor to how much 
that community can reduce the total emissions (see the dashed arrow in Figure 3).  While 
Sinnott-Armstrong argues that personal emissions play no role in increasing global 
emissions, and Jamieson argues that they play a significant role, I suggest they can play 
only a limited role.  Thus, one should focus on changing the structures in which one lives, 
which will indirectly reduce total emissions, rather than focus on directly reducing one’s 
own personal emissions. 
 
 
5. DIFFERENT MODELS, DIFFERENT FOCUS 
 
 
One might note that the three models do not necessarily contradict; one could 
reduce personal emissions and inspire one’s community while still working toward 
structural change.  As Jamieson notes, even if the best solution for curbing emissions is at 
the governmental level, this does not absolve individuals from action.  If the state is not 
acting, individuals must step in (170).  I agree -- to the extent that the models do not 
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contradict, one should employ both: work to reduce personal emissions within existing 
structures, while also working to change the structure.  However, the Lead-By-Example 
Model encourages one to stick to “green virtues” in order to be an effective role model.  I 
contend that this strict behavior comes at a cost.  
First, each model focuses one’s attention in a different direction for how to step 
in.  For an individual hoping to fulfill his moral duty to mitigate climate change, the 
Threshold Model recommends that he put aside worries about his own life and focus on 
large-scale political action.  Presumably the Threshold Model would lead one to think 
about the main national debates surrounding climate change, such as the details of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the relative merits of a cap & trade system versus a tax, changes to 
building codes, and economic incentives.  Many of these conversations have focused on 
technical fixes that maintain current lifestyles, such as increasing efficiency and 
developing new energy sources.  The Structural Emissions Model draws attention to the 
potential of the local level, as well.  Effective structural change can occur in cities and 
local communities, though both government and grassroots action.  Thus, the Structural 
Emissions Models leads one to ask the same questions as under the Threshold Model.  
However, this model also emphasizes questions about lifestyle changes and the 
significant redesign of cities, in the spirit of Arne Næss, Buckminster Fuller, or, more 
recently, Mitchell Joachim29.  Both models focus attention on the big picture and on 
changes that would affect whole communities at once, while the Structural Emissions 
model also focuses on the potential of cultural and lifestyle changes.   
By contrast, under the Lead-By-Example Model, one’s focus would turn inward 
to one’s own life:  Which light bulb to buy?  What is the best way to bike to work?  
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Where is the farmer’s market?  In general, these are good questions to be asking.  
Personal habits certainly can make a difference in energy use and therefore to carbon 
emissions30.  Yet even within the same physical structures, there is a question of 
efficiency.  For example, under the Lead-By-Example Model, each person must make the 
effort to remember to bring her own bag to the store, rather than relying on the free 
disposable bags provided.  By contrast, if there were no bags at the store (as used to be 
common outside of the U.S.), everyone has an immediate incentive to change their habits 
more quickly.  This example highlights how the Structural Emissions Model invites us to 
look at social and legal influences as well as physical ones, and so can point towards 
more efficient methods than the Lead-By-Example Model alone.  
Second, this example points to another concern.  Given that current structures put 
a limiting floor on how much one can reduce emissions and given how challenging it is to 
change these structures, one might suggest that it would be easier to simply opt out of the 
system entirely.  The suggestion would be that if everyone removed themselves from 
existing structures, we could reduce emissions even more.  If you cannot move closer to 
work, ride your bike there anyway.  If no local food is available, grow your own.  I have 
two responses to this objection.  The first is about feasibility; while changing existing 
structures is difficult, encouraging the majority of well-off U.S. citizens to voluntarily opt 
out of the structures (to “drive-off road”) could be even harder.  The proposal requires 
such a radical change that “role models” might be hailed as saints (at best) or derided as 
deviants (at worst).  In neither case, would they be followed.  It seems to me that attempts 
to change existing structures, as difficult as that sounds, would be more likely to succeed 
than attempts to lead by example.  The second worry is conceptual.  There are many 
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things (power plants, clothing production) that are presumably more efficient on a 
moderately large scale.  If we truly succeeded in getting people to live outside existing 
structures, would these new lives be more efficient than those within the structures?  If 
not, then one has missed the original intention, which was to reduce carbon emissions.  If 
so, then one has actually succeeded at the original intention, which is to change the 
structures in which one lives, and replace them with new ones.  In either case, the 
Structural Emissions Model provides a useful guide for thinking about our interactions 
with current structures. 
Finally, there might nonetheless arise cases where the two models conflict.  
Suppose I need to work long hours promoting a new government initiative outlawing 
Styrofoam take-out containers.  I can either order take-out so that I can stay up all night, 
or I can stop to cook my own food.  The Lead-By-Example Model encourages one to 
maintain personal integrity to set a good example (cook one’s own food), while the 
Structural Emissions Model encourages one to keep an eye on the big picture (focus 
one’s time on the initiative).31   Although this specific case might be a false dichotomy, it 
nonetheless illustrates my point: in cases of conflict, the Structural Emissions Model 
encourages individuals to work toward big, systemic change, even if it means violating 
“green virtues” in the short run.  While an individual can absolutely work for both 
personal and structural change at the same time, I suggest the priority should be on 
changing structures. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
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I suggest we read Walter-Sinnott Armstrong as offering a Threshold Model of 
personal emissions.  This model suggests that one has a moral obligation to focus on 
governmental and political changes, such as enacting laws to reduce total global 
emissions, rather than on reducing one’s personal emissions.  By contrast, Dale Jamieson 
appears to offer a Lead-By-Example Model, which focuses on personal change.  
Jamieson agrees that one’s personal emissions have little direct effect on global warming, 
but he argues that one cannot wait for everyone else to reduce their emissions.  One has a 
moral obligation to act to break up the standoff and to serve as a role model, thereby 
indirectly reducing total global emissions.  
However, the Threshold Model might seem implausible because of its reliance on 
a controversial causal analysis, and I suggest reasons to think the Lead-By-Example 
Model will be insufficient for the changes needed.  I propose a third model, which I call 
the Structural Emissions Model.  This model focuses on intermediate changes, such as 
local and city changes, in additional to larger political changes.  The physical and 
political structures in which one lives limit how much one can reduce personal emissions.  
Thus one has moral obligations to change the structures in which one lives, rather than to 
just directly reduce one’s personal emissions within a given structure.  Changing the 
structures, in turn, will indirectly reduce personal emissions by much more than is 
possible under the Lead-By-Example Model alone.   
Moreover, according to the Structural Emissions Model, harm is due to the 
structures of physical and social institutions; blame or cause of the harm cannot be traced 
to any one individual.  Yet, according to structural models, you have an obligation to act 
anyway, even if you did not cause the harm.  Thus the Structural Emissions Model avoids 
Climate Change and Structural Emissions:  
Moral Obligations at the Individual Level 
 
“Climate Change and Structural Emissions:  Moral Obligations at the Individual Level”  
by Monica Aufrecht. 2011. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 25:2 pg 201-213 
17 
the puzzle from the Threshold Model as to whether an individual causes climate change, 
and provides a different reason to support Sinnott-Armstrong’s conclusion: if reducing 
our aggregate emissions through personal change alone is not enough to drop total 
emissions below needed levels, then Sinnott-Armstrong is right that reducing our 
personal emissions should not be the main focus.   Even if a modest reduction can lessen 
some of the effects of climate change, one still has an obligation to try to reduce 
aggregate emissions even more than is possible under the Lead-By-Example Model.  I 
suggest that these reductions can be achieved through structural changes.  Thus, although 
I offer different reasons, in the end I agree with Sinnott-Armstrong that one has moral 
obligations to focus one’s efforts on a larger scale to reduce total global emissions, rather 
than on directly limiting personal emissions.    Let’s not be penny-wise and pound-
foolish. 
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Figure 3: Structural Emissions Model 
 
According to the Structural Emissions Model, once again 
changes to my individual emissions will not be enough to 
mitigate climate change. Other actions are morally 
req ired of me, but for reasons different from those in the 
Threshold M del. 
 
Figure1:  Threshold Model 
 
According to the Threshold Model, changes to my 
individual emissions will not be enough to mitigate 
climate change, and so they are not morally required. 
 
Figure 2: Lead-By-Example Model 
   
According to the Lead-By-Example Model, changes to 
aggregate individual emissions appear sufficient for 
mitigating climate change, and changes in my individual 
emissions can inspire other individual emissions changes, 
so changes in my individual emissions are morally 
required. 
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